SCION: Scalability, Control, and Isolation On Next-Generation Networks

26 Jun 2014 - 16:15
26 Jun 2014 - 17:15
Hochschulstr. 10 - (S2|02 Raum C110)
64289 Darmstadt

We present an Internet architecture designed to provide route control, failure isolation, and explicit trust information for end-to-end communications. SCION separates ASes into groups of independent routing sub-planes, called isolation domains, which then interconnect to form complete routes.

Isolation domains provide natural separation of routing failures and human misconfiguration, give endpoints strong control for both inbound and outbound traffic, provide meaningful and enforceable trust, and enable scalable routing updates with high path freshness. As a result, our architecture provides strong resilience and security properties as an intrinsic consequence of good design principles, avoiding piecemeal add-on protocols as security patches.

Meanwhile, SCION only assumes that a few top-tier ISPs in the isolation domain are trusted for providing reliable end-to-end communications, thus achieving a small Trusted Computing Base. Both our security analysis and evaluation results show that SCION naturally prevents numerous attacks and provides a high level of resilience, scalability, ontrol, and isolation.

Referenten: Prof. Adrian Perrig ETH Zürich, Network Security Group D-INFK, Schweiz

Veranstalter: Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt